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Summary
The recently updated OCHA Aide Memoire for the 
Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protec-
tion of Civilians in Armed Conflict does not propose 
specific measures on how to improve the security 
situation of humanitarian personnel. Although not 
intended as a blueprint of action, the language pre-
sented in the Aide Memoire is vague and general in 
character, as it is intended to fit all conflict settings. 
However, by performing a within-case analysis of 
Darfur, portraying humanitarian workers’ own per-
spective of their security situation, I here suggest 
some additional updates to be made to the Aide 
Memoire. Humanitarian personnel’s security situa-
tion in Darfur is characterized by unstable scenarios 
and insecure environments. Humanitarian agen-
cies base their security mainly on their own im-
age by adhering to humanitarian principles such 
as neutrality, impartiality and independence, as 
well as being in proximity to the local population.
As the traditional principles of humanitarian action 
are still pivotal to the protection of aid personnel, 
OCHA should incorporate the consideration and op-
erationalization of these more clearly in its Aide Mem-
oire. Furthermore, it should highlight the need for 
mandatory security training for all humanitarian staff, 
since this would greatly increase their ability to pro-
tect themselves. Finally, the ramification for host gov-
ernments when they deliberately obstruct humani-
tarian access should be clearly defined and outlined.
In recent years the United Nations (UN) has increas-
ingly addressed protection of civilians (PoC) in its 
peace operations. The UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been in 
the forefront of this development and has created an 
Aide Memoire that addresses protection issues on the 
ground concerning the conflict-affected population 
and humanitarian operations and personnel. This 
Aide Memoire can be described as a set of guidelines 
meant to assist parties in handling PoC issues both 
when planning peacekeeping operations and when 
in the field, and was recently updated to its third edi-
tion. But how well do the protection issues raised in 
OCHA’s Aide Memoire reflect the security needs of aid 
workers on the ground?
In short, the section on “Humanitarian Access and 
Safety and Security of Humanitarian Workers” of the 
Aide Memoire focuses on the need for all parties to ad-
here to international humanitarian law and human 
rights law, and to report to the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) on steps to improve protection. Moreover, it 
condemns all attacks on humanitarian workers and 
calls upon UN peacekeeping forces to provide protec-
tion and facilitate access (UNSC 2009). Nevertheless, 
the Aide Memoire does not offer concrete measures to 
facilitate humanitarian protection. In fact, its language 
is vague, intended to suit all war-type scenarios and 
conflict situations. By looking at the micro-dynamics 
of security on the ground in one particular case, it may 
be possible to identify specific measures to improve 
protection and further update the Aide Memoire. The 
conflict and human suffering in Darfur has resulted 
in a humanitarian initiative previously unprecedent-
ed. However, the working conditions for aid personnel 
have not been unproblematic. It has been character-
ized by insecurities and sporadic attacks on convoys 
and personnel, and several aid workers have been 
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killed. Darfur thus represents a legitimate case for re-
searching the micro-dynamics of humanitarian secu-
rity. 
Darfur’s Security Landscape
The 2008 statistics on security incidents that involved 
humanitarian personnel in Darfur are worrying and 
reveal an unpredictable and insecure environment. 
During that year, 277 humanitarian vehicles were car-
jacked, there were 192 break inns or armed assaults 
on humanitarian premises, 218 humanitarian person-
nel were temporarily kidnapped in relation to the car-
jacking, and 11 people were killed (UN Humanitarian 
Official 2009 [Telephone interview]). Whilst the secu-
rity situation has improved slightly for the internally 
displaced people in recent months, it has grown even 
worse for the aid personnel working in Darfur (Dan-
ChurchAid 2009). This development can be seen as a 
direct result of the arrest warrant issued for President 
al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Following the warrant, thirteen humanitarian aid 
agencies were expelled from Sudan, decreasing hu-
manitarian staff stationed in the region by 40 percent. 
In addition, attacks on humanitarian actors seem to 
have become more targeted, which in turn has lead 
to restricted movement and increased precautions. 
As a consequence, security has become more time 
consuming, depriving agencies of their precious time 
spent on aid distribution. This raises questions as to 
how security may be improved.     
According to humanitarian personnel who are work-
ing or have worked in Darfur, the most important se-
curity measures are acceptance from and proximity 
to the population. Such ordinary activities as interna-
tional humanitarian staff drinking tea with the popu-
lation in the local market may not seem to be a stra-
tegic action, but in terms of security this is essential. 
However, acceptance is not enough to ensure security 
and needs to be supplemented by protection strategies 
such as protective walls and gates, safe rooms, com-
munication equipment, clear operational strategies 
and security training. Although relying too heavily 
on such measures would be counterproductive as it 
would alienate aid workers from the local population 
thus omitting important security information and fos-
tering prejudism. 
During the course of this research it has become appar-
ent that most aid workers lack sufficient security train-
ing. While most aid agencies seem to offer their staff 
a theoretical course before sending them to the field, 
security is only one part of it. Moreover, the course is 
often quite generic, lacking country-specific security 
problems and measures. Roger Håland (2009 [inter-
view]), for instance, admit he would have liked to have 
some practical security training before he went to Dar-
fur. In his words: “It is not enough to have a good heart; 
you also need a good head on your shoulders to evalu-
ate the situation and to understand the context you are 
in.” Several of the informants for this research admit 
that due to time restraints, sometimes newly recruited 
staff is sent out without any training whatsoever. In-
stead, humanitarian organizations seem to base their 
security knowledge of their staff more on experience 
rather than training, and experienced staff is supposed 
to look after and guide their new colleagues. However, 
as Tony Marchant (2009 [interview]) has pointed out, 
such experienced personnel can sometimes be hard 
to come by. Thus, the Aide Memoire should highlight 
the need for mandatory security training for all aid 
personnel. While the Aide Memoire does mention the 
need for organization personnel to receive training 
in international law, human rights and refugee law, it 
does not mention security training. By doing so, how-
ever, the Memoire would highlight a specific task that 
would greatly increase the protection of humanitarian 
workers in the field.  
 
Neutrality
The foundation of the proximity to and acceptance 
from the local population is grounded in the tradi-
tional principles of humanitarian action. In terms of 
security, neutrality is viewed as the most important of 
these in addition to impartiality and independence. 
These principles have their roots in the emergence of 
the international humanitarian system at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and represents aid agencies’ 
distinct form of intervention to purely relieve suffer-
ing and protect life in conflict. The findings when re-
searching the case of Darfur reveals that these princi-
ples are still pivotal in terms of humanitarian security 
in the field. In Turid Lægreid’s (2009 [interview]), the 
former Head of OCHA’s sub-office in North Darfur, 
words: “the more difficult the situation is the more 
important are the principles of humanitarian action. 
Without upholding these principles the situation 
would have been worse”. The Aide Memoire should 
therefore highlight the importance that all parties 
involved in a peacekeeping mission should respect 
these principles and assist aid agencies in maintain-
ing them. For example, military divisions should not 
distribute humanitarian aid, because this causes a 
blurring of the lines between civil and military opera-
tions, and may ultimately result in a loss of perceived 
neutrality on behalf of humanitarian actors.    
In Darfur, the main security problem for aid agencies 
is banditry. In terms of neutrality strategies this is a 
problem, because banditry affects everyone whether 
you are perceived to be neutral, impartial, and inde-
pendent or not. Thus, it may be questioned how these 
principles can be the foundation for security in the 
Darfur context. On the other hand, it may also be, al-
though difficult to prove, that for the very reason these 
principles are applied by the humanitarian organi-
zations to ensure security, banditry is the only main 
threat. If aid agencies in Darfur would have openly 
taken sides and distributed aid partially, the security 
situation would most likely have been worse. This is 
3because the organizations would then be perceived as 
part of the conflict itself and thus evident targets of at-
tack by enemy groups. 
Evelyne Schmid (2009) argues that effective protec-
tion strategies should be developed by focusing on the 
reasons why civilians are deliberately affected. In this 
case, we might say that the motivation behind the ban-
ditry is desperate poverty. Thus, improved living condi-
tions for the Darfur people would increase protection. 
This, however, is the overall aim of the humanitarian 
agencies and the reason why they are there. Conse-
quently, and as pointed out by Schmid herself, there 
might not always be “a system out there that can pro-
tect people in ongoing conflict” (Schmid 2009: 357).
Impartiality
Impartial aid distribution based on need is imperative 
in terms of aid personnel’s security. In this regard, 
performing their work in an open and transparent 
manner also builds trust and thus fosters protection. 
An incident described by Tony Marchant (2009 [inter-
view]), an Emergency Coordinator for Médecins sans 
Frontières (MSF), exemplifies this. He describes one 
time his MSF team was driving through a checkpoint 
in a rebel area to open a clinic there and was stopped 
by a commander who wanted to take their drugs and 
equipment. The team asked him what he would do 
of it was his wife who was ill, and after some tension 
they were allowed to continue. Later that day the same 
MSF team returned to the checkpoint carrying a preg-
nant woman who had to have a caesarean operation or 
else she would die. Such actions build trust, Marchant 
explains, because it shows the organization is actually 
performing the work it set out to do. 
Independence
In terms of the humanitarian principles of independ-
ence, the greatest issue raised in the Darfur context 
is aid agencies’ relation to UN peacekeepers and to 
what extent they coordinate security with the UN. The 
UN is a large organization with a well-established net-
work, and aid organizations have in general coordinat-
ed their security to great extent in Darfur. However, 
most humanitarian agencies have chosen to stay far 
away from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and would not accept 
an escort by UNAMID peacekeeping forces as they are 
not seen as neutral. The previous African Union Mis-
sion in Sudan (AMIS) was perceived as taking side in 
the conflict by many. Partly because they negotiated 
the Darfur peace agreement which included some par-
ties but not others. For this reason they were targeted 
and lost more than 20 people in 2007. Now when the 
UN has taken over, the same troops are still in Dar-
fur, they have only exchanged their green helmet with 
a blue one. As a result, UNAMID hampers the secu-
rity of humanitarian agencies in some circumstances 
rather than improving it. For example, UNAMID and 
UN humanitarian groups utilize similar helicopters 
and vehicles for transportation with UN written on 
them. This can easily be misunderstood by the local 
population and the helicopters and vehicles have con-
sequently been shot at several times. Accordingly, the 
Aide Memoire should recommend that peacekeeping 
forces and humanitarian actors utilize different vehi-
cles with distinctive markings. This might diminish 
the likelihood of attack and thus improve aid workers’ 
security.     
As mentioned above, having a close relationship with 
the local population is seen as the most important 
measure of humanitarian security. However, in situ-
ations where the host government is part of the con-
flict proximity may also have a negative effect. This is 
because aid agencies might be perceived by the gov-
ernment as taking sides with the local population. In 
Darfur, proximity to the population may have been 
one of the reasons for the expulsion of humanitarian 
organizations in March 2009 following the arrest war-
rant issued for President al-Bashir. This is because the 
close relationship between the aid agencies and the 
population may have caused the government of Sudan 
to fear they were reporting to the ICC.  
Even before the arrest warrant, however, the govern-
ment of Sudan obstructed humanitarian access by 
making it difficult for aid agencies to obtain travel per-
mits and visas. In addition, the Sudanese government 
would make it difficult to commence and close projects 
by constantly inventing new laws that required the aid 
teams to implement new procedures. While the Aide 
Memoire rightly highlights the responsibility of host 
governments to facilitate the provision of humanitar-
ian assistance, it does not include specific measures 
to be implemented if a government obstructs aid dis-
tribution. By outlining specific repercussions, the lan-
guage of the Memoire would appear less vague and 
obstructing humanitarian access would hopefully be-
come less lucrative for host governments.         
Conclusion
When comparing the security needs identified in 
Darfur to the issues raised in the Aide Memoire it be-
comes apparent that some improvements are called 
for. Although changing micro-dynamics both within 
and between conflict environments makes it difficult 
to establish an all-encompassing Aide Memoire, some 
updates could be made. First, the Aide Memoire should 
focus more on the principles of humanitarian action 
and on all actors involved in an integrated mission be-
ing sensitive and considerate of these. In cases where 
UN peacekeepers are not perceived as neutral, such as 
in Darfur, UN forces should focus more on area pro-
tection than protecting humanitarian convoys and in-
dividual agencies. Clearly distinguishing between UN 
peacekeeping and humanitarian vehicles with clear 
markings is also important to this end. In addition, as 
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most aid agencies lack sufficient security training, the 
Memoire should stress the importance of mandatory 
security training for all aid personnel who are to work 
in the field. Such training should entail both a theoret-
ical and a practical segment consisting of simulation 
exercises as this would greatly increase aid workers’ 
ability to protect themselves. Finally, while the Aide 
Memoire rightly highlights the responsibility of host 
governments to ensure unimpeded humanitarian ac-
cess, it should outline more clearly the repercussions 
when a government deliberately fails to do so.  
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